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GENERATIVE EXPLANATION AND INDIVIDUALISM 
IN AGENT-BASED SIMULATION 
 
 
Abstract. Social scientists associate agent-based simulation models with three ideas about 
explanation: they provide generative explanations, they are models of mechanisms, and they 
implement methodological individualism. In light of a philosophical account of explanation, we show 
that these ideas are not necessarily related and offer an account of the explanatory import of agent-
based simulation models. We also argue that their bottom-up research strategy should be 
distinguished from methodological individualism.  
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1. Introduction 
Over the last two decades, agent-based simulations have been increasingly employed throughout the 
social sciences. However, the methodology of agent-based simulation (ABS henceforth) is not yet 
sufficiently understood, and its legitimacy and implications are still subject of debate. For example, 
many economists are wary of simulations because they regard them as inferior vis-à-vis analytical 
models (Lehtinen and Kuorikoski 2007). In contrast, advocates of ABS methodology praise its ability 
to overcome the limitations of traditional formal modeling tools (Miller and Page 2007; Macy and 
Flache 2009).  
In this paper our focus is on the explanatory uses of ABS (though of course ABS are used for other 
purposes as well). In particular, we examine three ideas about explanation that are often associated 
with the methodology of ABS: it provides explanations that are generative (J. Epstein 2006) and 
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mechanistic (e.g. Gilbert and Ahrweiler 2009; Hedström 2005; Macy et al. 2011) and it is an 
implementation of methodological individualism (e.g. Macy and Flache 2009; Neumann 2008; B. 
Epstein 2012). We argue that, contrary to what it is sometimes believed, these ideas are not 
necessarily related. With the help of a theory of explanation, we offer an account of how ABS models  
explain. We show that the ideas of generation and mechanism are sufficient to define the bottom-up 
research strategy of ABS, but that the latter should not be conflated with the doctrine of 
methodological individualism.  
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 briefly introduces the main features of ABS in 
the social sciences. Section 3 presents our account of how model-based simulations provide 
explanations. In section 4 we show how the idea of bottom-up explanation is related to ideas of 
generative and mechanism-based explanation. Section 5 brings up the idea of methodological 
individualism. Section 6 presents an example of ABS study and shows that some of its key explanatory 
variables are structural rather than individual properties. Finally, section 7 concludes our argument 
that it is misleading to regard ABS models as implementations of methodological individualism. 
2. Agent-based simulation in social science 
In this section we briefly summarize the main features of ABS as they are typically employed in social 
science. ABS includes a set of agents and a set of rules describing the behavior of those agents. Agents 
interact with each other and with the environment, and these local interactions often bring about 
surprising phenomena at the social level. As summarized by Macy and Flache (2009), the agents in ABS 
models are typically endowed with interesting properties at both the cognitive and social level. Agents 
are heuristic in that they follow simple behavioral rules that can be interpreted as habits, rituals, 
routines, norms, and the like. They are also adaptive in that they respond to feedback from their 
environment through learning and evolution. Agents are autonomous and able to change aspects of 
their environment to attain their goals. Their autonomy, however, is constrained: agents are assumed 
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to be interdependent insofar as the local environment to which they react is constituted by the 
beliefs, goals, and behaviors of other agents. ABS methodology also permits the modeling of 
heterogeneous agents, namely agents that differ in their beliefs, goals and rules of behavior. Finally, 
agents can be embedded in networks. All this means that population dynamics are emergent 
outcomes of local interactions. ABS also allows agents to change their structural locations or break 
off relations with their neighbors and seek out new relations (Miller and Page 2007, 80-87; Macy and 
Flache 2009, 247). 
Compared to the traditional modeling tools employed in the social sciences, ABS is claimed to have a 
number of advantages. First, as we have seen, simulations allow one to be flexible about the 
characteristics of agents and hence break away from the strictures of the assumption of optimizing 
behavior characteristic of rational choice models. Furthermore, ABS allows modelers to study 
equilibrium outcomes as well as the dynamics of systems. Finally, unlike standard economic models, 
where for reasons of tractability the modeler has to work with cases with either one, two or an 
infinite number of agents, ABS can work with any number of agents and hence can provide more 
realistic models of social processes (Miller and Page 2007; Macy and Flache 2009; Ylikoski 2014.). 
3. Explaining with simulation models 
Our account of explanation is realistic in spirit, for it is about tracking the network of dependencies 
related to the phenomenon of interest. In other words, scientific understanding is constituted by 
knowledge of dependencies, knowledge that gives us the ability to make correct what-if inferences 
about the phenomenon (Woodward 2003; Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2010). The point of (explanatory) 
models is to represent those dependencies in a cognitively salient way, so that they can be used to 
make what-if inferences about the phenomena under investigation. In ABS models we can call 
assumptions that pick out explanatorily relevant factors ‘explanans variables’ and the outcome to be 
explained the ‘explanandum variable’.  
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In this account, mechanisms can be understood as descriptions of the networks of counterfactual 
dependencies that characterize the system in question. Knowledge about the components of the 
system, their properties and their organization make it possible to understand why the counterfactual 
dependencies that characterize the system are the way they do and what their background conditions 
are (Woodward 2003; Craver 2007; Ylikoski & Kuorikoski 2010). One of the advantages of ABS 
methodology is that it allows systematic study of how the organization of the components affects the 
overall behavior of the system. 
How can ABS models be used to provide explanations? To answer this question, we distinguish two 
elements in the process of using ABS for explanation. First, there is the generative component of the 
simulation practice. Here, the simulator sets the rules of interaction for the agents and runs the 
simulation to produce some macro outcome. If the macro outcome has the characteristics of interest 
(such as ending with a segregated equilibrium (Schelling 1978) or creating a pattern found in empirical 
material (J. Epstein 2006)), then we have a proof of possibility. In such cases the simulation 
demonstrates that the mechanism implemented therein can, in principle, generate the pattern of 
interest.  
While such a proof of possibility is valuable, its contribution to explanation is limited. The simulation 
does not allow us to identify the conditions under which the mechanism produces the outcome nor 
which assumptions of the model are responsible for the outcome of interest. In other words, the 
simulation does not provide us an understanding of how the outcomes systematically depend on the 
assumptions of the model. Such an understanding is obtained in the experimental component of 
simulation practice.  
The experimental component consists of the systematic variation of the simulation assumptions1. The 
point of such ‘experimentation’ is to see how the assumptions make a difference to the outcome. It 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Mäki (2005) and Morgan (2003) compare the manipulation of modeling assumptions to experimental 
manipulation. 
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provides an understanding of how the outcome of the simulation depends on various assumptions, 
thus providing knowledge about the relevant networks of dependence. On the basis of this 
knowledge, the simulator can make what-if inferences about the simulation. As her ability to make 
such inferences increases, her understanding of the simulation model also increases. 
All ABS models include a generative component, but some almost completely lack an experimental 
component. An example of such a simulation is Kirman and Vriend’s simulation of the Marseille fish 
market (Kirman and Vriend 2001). The stated goal of this model is to explain two stylized facts that 
characterize the fish market in Marseille, namely the high loyalty of buyers to sellers and the 
persistence of price dispersion (Kirman and Vriend 2001, 459). These characteristics are puzzling, as 
the same buyers and sellers meet every day in the same place. In their ABS model there are two kinds 
of agents, namely buyers and sellers. Sellers decide on the quantities to supply, the prices and whether 
or not to treat loyal buyers differently. Buyers only decide which sellers to visit and which price to 
accept. Here, it is assumed that the agents learn through reinforcement. In the words of Kirman and 
Vriend: 
The model explains both stylized facts, price dispersion and high loyalty. In a coevolutionary 
process, buyers learn to become loyal as sellers learn to offer higher utility to loyal buyers, 
while these sellers, in turn, learn to offer higher utility to loyal buyers as they happen to realize 
higher gross revenues from loyal buyers. (Kirman and Vriend 2001, 459.)  
In our view the authors may be overstating the extent to which the model explains the stylized facts. 
This is not to understate the importance of this model and its result. As their simulation can generate 
high loyalty and price dispersion, it achieves an abstract proof of possibility. Such a proof shows what 
kind of assumptions could produce the outcome, but not how that occurs or whether those 
assumptions are the only way to generate the outcome of interest. The model does not provide much 
insight into the crucial how-questions, as the experimental component is almost completely absent. 
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(The authors only vary one condition, namely the heterogeneity of buyers). Thus, insofar as the 
authors do not systematically explore how the outcome of interest depends on the details of the 
model, the full explanatory import of the model remains an open question.  
On our account of explanation, to provide a proper explanation of the phenomenon in question, the 
simulator should show not only that the assumptions made about the agents bring about the observed 
macro outcome, but also how they do so. This is done by spelling out the mechanism implemented in 
the simulation and by showing how the differences in outcomes systematically depend on changes in 
the assumptions of the simulation. When simulation practice involves an experimental component, 
the assumptions of the simulation are systematically varied in order to learn the effects of these 
changes on the outcome of the simulation. This makes it possible to learn more about the network of 
counterfactual dependencies that characterizes the simulated system. This network of dependencies is 
precisely what the description of the explanatory mechanism implemented in the simulation amounts 
to.  
Note that there are two reasons for the systematic variation of the assumptions of a simulation. The 
first is to learn about the systematic dependencies between the explanans and the explanandum within 
the specified mechanical configuration. The second is to learn which unrealistic assumptions matter 
for the model’s results, a purpose that is typically achieved by robustness analysis (Levins 
1966; Wimsatt 1981; Weisberg 2006; Kuorikoski, Lehtinen and Marchionni 2010). Both purposes are 
equally important for the explanatory use of simulations, but the contribution of robustness analysis 
to explanation is only indirect. Usually robustness analysis is aimed at investigating the role of those 
assumptions made to facilitate the tractability of the underlying model or of the simulation itself (as 
for instance when a city is represented as a checkerboard). Such assumptions are known to be 
unrealistic but are made because replacing them with realistic assumptions is either difficult or 
impossible in the first place. In robustness analysis such assumptions are usually replaced with other 
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unrealistic assumptions (as for instance when an environment is modeled as a grid and then as a 
torus). The point is to learn whether the change makes a difference to the simulation outcome. If the 
result is robust with respect to the change, the researcher can infer that the given unrealistic 
assumption does not play a crucial role in the model and thus it is not an important explanatory 
variable in the model.  
As the purpose of robustness analysis is to identify those assumptions that do not play a central role 
in the model, it does not matter whether they are realistic. In contrast, explanatory analysis targets 
those assumptions that do affect the simulation outcomes. Here, it is important that the assumptions 
make a difference within a realistic range of variation. Only these assumptions enable inferences to 
real-world systems – even though whether a given modification has a reasonable empirical 
counterpart is an empirical question through and through.  
Sometimes modellers do explicitly distinguish between the two kinds of manipulations, but this is not 
the main criterion for drawing the distinction. In many cases robustness analysis can direct attention 
to factors that were previously thought to be irrelevant (or vice versa), thus defying the modeller’s 
expectations. In this sense robustness analysis and the variation of assumptions for explanatory 
purposes are complementary and often concurrent practices. At an abstract level the purpose of both 
is to explore the properties of both the model and its components in order to learn what depends on 
what.  
More importantly for our purposes, the distinction between the two different aims of variation of a 
simulation’s assumptions provides the criteria for identifying explanatory variables in ABS models: we 
should look for assumptions that are varied by the simulators (in a more or less systematic way), 
make a difference to the explanandum variables of interest and are assumed to have a realistic 
sociological interpretation. We will illustrate these points in Section 6 with the help of a simulation 
model of the spread of unpopular norms, which includes manipulations of various of its assumptions. 
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4. The bottom-up strategy of explanation in ABS 
The typical aim of ABS is to provide explanation for macro phenomena such as the emergence and 
dynamics of system level properties (e.g. distributions of beliefs and behaviors within the population, 
levels of segregation, networks between the agents). In contrast to more traditional equation-based 
simulation approaches, ABS does not directly relate macro-variables to each other; rather, it 
represents a bottom-up research strategy that investigates macro phenomena by focusing on agents and 
their properties, behaviours and interactions (bottom). It shows how what occurs at this level 
produces, or can produce, the phenomena of interest (up). When building the model, the simulator 
specifies the rules of behavior for the parts of the system (the agents) and studies how their local 
interactions generate the relevant macro outcomes. Thus, the simulation requires an explicit 
consideration of the relevant causal mechanisms. This is in sharp contrast to variable-based 
simulations, which often operate with macro-variables and do not include explicit thinking about 
mechanisms. Furthermore, the macro outcomes of ABS models are often surprising, which supports 
the idea of a bottom-up research strategy. The concept of bottom-up research strategy suffices to 
make sense of two ideas about explanation in ABS: generation and mechanism. We briefly examine 
each in turn and then argue that methodological individualism does not capture anything useful that is 
not captured by the idea of bottom-up explanation.  
4.1. Generative explanation 
As the purpose of ABS is to obtain macro outcomes from assumptions about agents, their 
interdependent behaviors and the features of the environment in which they act, it is quite natural 
then to interpret ABS models in terms of generative explanation. Joshua Epstein (2006) gives the 
strongest formulation of the idea of generative explanation. According to Epstein, growing the macro-
level outcome explanandum with ABS is a necessary condition for its explanation. This is the origin of 
the well-known slogan: ”if you didn’t grow it, you didn’t explain it” (J. Epstein 2006, 8-10). Epstein’s claim 
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points towards an important feature of ABS: if we are interested in the bottom-up explanations of 
social phenomena, ABS provides a much-needed tool. However, Epstein’s claim is overstated (Ylikoski 
2014). First, it is reasonable to assume that explanations of social phenomena have been given before 
the use of ABS. Second, it is often the case that the result obtained in a given simulation could be 
generated in a number of alternative ways; thus the simulation only provides a how-possibly explanation 
(Ylikoski 2014). Hence, generative sufficiency is an essential explanatory step, but it does not imply 
that the empirical outcome to be explained was actually produced in that fashion. Third, simply 
”growing” the phenomenon of interest is not sufficient for a proper understanding of it. Merely having 
a simulation that – after a lot of tinkering – produces the right kind of results does not yet yield 
understanding as it does not enable to make what if –inferences beyond that particular simulation 
configuration. The further challenge is to understand how the specified micro-configuration produces 
the phenomenon and what the background conditions of its production are. Thus, Macy and Flache 
(2009, 263) are right when they challenge Epstein’s slogan by claiming that: ”If you don’t know how you 
grew it, you didn’t explain it.” The idea of generation is necessary for explanatory understanding, but it is 
not sufficient. We also need to understand the working of the simulation and the systematic 
dependencies that the experimental component aims to uncover. The idea of mechanism aims to 
capture precisely these elements of ABS. 
4.2 Mechanistic explanation 
In the ABS literature, the idea of generative explanation is often associated with the idea of 
mechanism-based explanation (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010), as suggested for example by the 
following quotation: 
When we write a set of computational algorithms (the program), formalizing the generative 
hypotheses the consequences of which are to be studied, what we are doing is hypothesizing a 
series of generative mechanisms. When we execute the program ... we engender the process 
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deriving from the set of posited generative mechanisms. With the technical distinction between 
program “writing,” “compilation,” and “execution” it becomes clear that a “process” is nothing 
more than the dynamic aspect of one (or several) mechanism(s): it is what the mechanism can 
trigger. (Manzo 2007, 5–6.) 
One of the premises of the mechanistic approach in social science is that a proper explanation of 
social phenomena requires an understanding of the causal mechanisms that bring them about. This 
implies paying attention to the entities of which mechanisms are made (the agents, their properties, 
actions, and relations) rather than treating them as black boxes. That is, for the explanation of social 
phenomena it is not sufficient to identify the macro-level changes that produce them. It is crucial to 
show how macro-states affect individuals at a certain point in time and how the actions of those 
individuals produce new macro-states at a later time (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010). From this 
perspective, ABS represents an especially useful tool for theoretically oriented social scientists: It 
allows testing whether certain theoretical ideas are, even in principle, sufficient to generate the 
phenomenon in question (Epstein 2006; Ylikoski 2014). Furthermore, ABS models can easily be 
interpreted as representing social interactions: the agents can be interpreted as having goals and 
beliefs, standing in various social relations to each other, having the resources needed to attain their 
goals, and also affecting each other’s possibilities of action via their behavior. As it should be clear by 
now, the methodology of ABS, and in particular its experimental component, facilitates the provision 
of mechanism-based explanations as it enables the systematic study of how the macro phenomenon is 
generated from assumptions about agents as well as from various non-individualistic assumptions.  
5. Is this methodological individualism? 
The bottom-up research strategy suffices to capture the potential of ABS as tools for yielding both 
generative and mechanistic explanations. We have seen that the generative and experimental 
component of simulation practice enables the simulator to explain macro phenomena by focusing on 
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agents and their properties, behaviours and interactions and by showing how what occurs at this level 
generates or can generate the phenomena of interest. Many authors, however, have suggested that 
ABS is an implementation of methodological individualism, or that there is an inherent connection 
between ABS and methodological individualism. For example Macy et alii (2011, 252) write that ABS 
“modeling is a formal implementation of ‘methodological individualism’ … .” (see also Flache and Macy 
2009; Neumann 2008; Epstein 201.) The ideas of generative mechanisms and methodological 
individualism are sometimes packaged together. For example, Keith Sawyer states that “[a]rtificial 
societies are mechanistic in the contemporary sense. They are also firmly methodologically 
individualist.” (Sawyer 2004, 263; see also Sawyer 2003, 340). Similarly, Macy et. al. (2011: 252) write 
that ABS modeling “… is a formal implementation of methodological individualism.” (see also Flache 
and Macy 2009; Neumann 2008; Epstein 2012.) Our goal is to show that there is no inherent (let 
alone necessary) connection between ABS, the generative mechanism-based explanations they can 
deliver and methodological individualism. In fact, as we will argue, there is much to gain by breaking 
down this connection.  
What leads some practitioners and commentators to associate ABS with methodological individualism 
is quite clear. In any sensible interpretation, methodological individualism would imply something like 
a bottom-up research strategy (although, of course, not all methodological individualists are likely to 
be excited about the ABS methodology). However, the crucial question is whether the opposite 
implication holds true. Here the problem is in discerning what the doctrine of methodological 
individualism actually claims. As is well known, methodological individualism has had a variety of 
meanings and interpretations over the years (Pettit 1993; Kincaid 1997; Udehn 2001; Hodgson 2007). 
Consequently, the term lacks a clear and generally accepted definition. This is a problem for both 
advocates and critics of methodological individualism. Since we believe that the debate over the 
proper definition of methodological individualism is a distraction from the real methodological issues, 
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we will not review the many interpretations of methodological individualism available in the literature. 
Instead, we will work with a definition of methodological individualism that is substantive enough to 
be non-trivial but that retains the typical connotation of the concept. 
Therefore, we take the doctrine of methodological individualism to roughly pertain to the following:  
[MI] Social phenomena can only be explained (or they are best explained) by accounts that only 
refer to individuals, their properties and their interactions.  
There are two aspects to note about this reading of methodological individualism. First, [MI] is a 
thesis about explanation, not about ontology. Therefore, arguments about the existence of social 
wholes, structures and such entities vis-à-vis individuals do not directly bear on arguments about 
explanation of social phenomena. Second, [MI] qualifies as a strong version of methodological 
individualism in that it holds that explanation of social phenomena should appeal only to individuals, 
their properties and interactions. The corollary of such a view is that non-individual properties are 
denied non-derivative explanatory status.  
Some individualists endorse weaker versions of the thesis, according to which non-individual 
properties can play a (non-derivative) explanatory role via their effects on individuals. It is legitimate 
to ask, however, in what sense these more liberal positions are individualistic and whether they 
represent the same position that many anti-individualists are trying to defend (see Udehn 2001). As 
said above, we do not want to get entangled in debates about the proper definition of individualism. 
For our argument, it is sufficient that [MI] is sufficiently close to what is commonly understood as the 
content of the methodological individualist doctrine.  
6. An example: A model of the spread of unpopular norms 
Our strategy against the association of ABS with methodological individualism is to argue that if some 
of the key explanatory variables in ABS models cannot be meaningfully interpreted as ‘individualistic’, 
then ABS explanations should not be regarded as implementations of methodological individualism. To 
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make such an argument, we need a real example of an explanatory ABS model. We have chosen a 
simulation model designed by Damon Centola, Robb Willer and Michael Macy (2005) as we think it is 
one of the best examples of the use of an ABS model in theoretical sociology and the authors have 
elsewhere suggested that there is a close relationship between ABS and methodological individualism 
(Macy et. al. 2010).  
The model implements the ”emperor dilemma” familiar from the Hans Christian Andersen’s fable. In 
the model, agents must decide whether to comply with and enforce a norm that is supported by a 
few fanatics and opposed by the vast majority. The model is used to examine the population level 
implications of the use of norm enforcement to falsely signal genuine conviction. The idea is to study 
whether a very small fraction of true believers can spark a cascade of conformity and false 
enforcement that quickly engulfs a vulnerable population. Thus, the norm does not become enforced 
because people are converted to new beliefs; rather, it is because they feel the need to affirm the 
sincerity of their (false) conformity. 
In the simulation, the population consists of agents who differ in their beliefs and convictions. A small 
group of true believers is assumed to have such strong convictions that they always comply with the 
norm. When dissatisfied with the level of compliance of others, they may enforce the norm. The 
remainder of the population consists of disbelievers who privately oppose the norm, but with less 
conviction than that of the true believers. The disbelievers may deviate from the norm or even 
pressure others to deviate as well. However, the disbelievers can also be pressured to support the 
norm and even to enforce it. At every iteration of the simulation, each agent observes how many of 
his neighbors are complying with the norm and how many are deviating. They also observe how many 
neighbors are enforcing the compliance and how many are enforcing deviations from the norm. Based 
on this information, the agents decide whether to comply or deviate and whether to force others to 
behave similarly in the next round. 
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In the paper, Centola and his associates report the manipulation of three kinds of variable: 1) access 
to information about the behavior of other agents, 2) the frequency distribution and clustering of true 
believers, and 3) the network topology (Centola et. al. 2005: 1021). The results of these simulations 
are surprising: cascades are much easier to achieve than expected. A small group of true believers can 
bring about a cascade in population where neighborhoods are local; however they are unable to do so 
in fully connected populations. Moreover, the clustering of true believers turns out to be relevant: a 
very small cluster of believers can trigger a cascade, while a great number of randomly distributed 
believers cannot. Finally, when a small number of random ties reduce the overlap between local 
neighborhoods, cascades are prevented. On the basis of these observations, the authors conclude 
that unpopular norms thrive on local misrepresentations of the underlying population distribution; 
that is, cascades are outcomes of a sampling problem. However, the most interesting result is that 
disbelievers are crucial for the emergence of cascades. Without them cascades do not begin, and if 
the agents start to convert into true believers, the following of the norm might paradoxically collapse.  
Now let us take a closer look at the manipulated variables. From the point of view of our argument, 
the crucial question is whether they are individual or structural properties. By structural properties we 
mean properties that are attributed to larger scale entities than individuals or if they are attributed to 
individuals, they presuppose some larger scale entities. These non-individual properties constitute a 
rather heterogeneous class; what they share in common is the property of being non-individual 
properties (Ylikoski 2012). The network topology is clearly a structural assumption about the macro 
structure of the population. It is a structural property in the sense that there is no meaningful way to 
attribute it to an individual; it is always attributed to a larger scale entity. Similarly, the frequency and 
degree of clustering of true believers (and other agents) is a population-level attribute that cannot be 
applied to individuals. Finally, while the access to information about other agents is attributed to an 
individual agent, it is more properly understood as a structural assumption about relations between 
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agents. The relations between individual agents and the overall configuration of these relations in the 
population are population-level attributes that do not apply to individuals.  
Thus, all three key variables are rather prototypical non-individual structural macro properties 
(Ylikoski 2012, 26-33). Furthermore, all three satisfy our suggested criteria for explanatory variables. 
First, they make a difference to the outcome, as whether or not a cascade is triggered depends on 
them. Second, they also have a realistic sociological interpretation, as they capture the degree to 
which agents can obtain an accurate picture of how widespread genuine belief in a given norm is.  
Explanatory structural variables like these are not unique to this particular case. It is quite common to 
find ABS models that focus on variables such as the composition of the population, contacts between 
agents, and agents’ freedom of movement (e.g. Flache and Macy 2011, Centola and Macy 2007). This is 
the case even for the relatively simple segregation models inspired by Thomas Schelling’s work (e.g. 
Benard and Willer 2007; Bruch and Mare 2006; Clark and Fossett 2008; Fossett 2006; also see 
Ylikoski 2014). One of the attractions of ABS modeling is precisely that such assumptions can be 
systematically manipulated together with assumptions about individuals. For example, the effects of 
changes of the size of the neighborhood with which agents interact or of the connections that agents 
have beyond their immediate neighborhood can be studied, for example, by a random rewiring of the 
links between agents (e.g. Centola and Macy 2007). The agents’ freedom of movement brings in 
another set of structural assumptions, such as the relative size of the available empty spaces and the 
rules for movement across them. The ‘experimental’ manipulation of structural and individual 
assumptions makes it possible for the simulator to investigate the network of dependencies (i.e. the 
mechanism) that characterizes the phenomenon to be explained. What counts as part of mechanism 
depends on what makes a difference to the macro-phenomenon, regardless of whether the variables 
are structural or individualistic. 
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7. Breaking the association between methodological individualism and ABS 
As the model of Centola and colleagues demonstrates, some of the crucial explanatory variables in 
ABS are structural. This constitutes a prima facie case against the association of ABS with 
methodological individualism. The burden of proof then shifts to those who wish to make the 
association: they should show that those explanatory variables are either not explanatory, or that 
they can be credibly interpreted as individualistic. The discussion above makes clear that, denying 
their explanatory relevance is not a viable strategy; reinterpreting them as individualistic properties 
does not look a very promising strategy either. In this case the challenge is to find a credible 
formulation of individualistic properties that could still accommodate the relevant explanatory 
variables. The definition of individualistically acceptable properties should not be allowed to trivialize 
the debate between traditional individualists and their critics. To make this argument more 
compelling, we offer some substantial arguments against the strong version of methodological 
individualism and some points of caution against associating ABS with methodological individualism 
that apply to both its strong and weak formulations. 
Our first substantial argument is based on the observation that ABS methodology does not dictate 
how the agents are to be interpreted: while in many applications it is natural to interpret agents as 
individuals, they can also be households, groups, organizations, or even intrapersonal cognitive 
processes. The interpretation of the simulation only requires that it makes sense to ascribe to the 
agents the behavior defined by the rules. Consequently, even within the same simulation, agents can 
be of various kinds. Thus, in this respect ABS is not by itself individualistic, and restricting its use to 
individualistically acceptable applications (that is, applications in which agents are to be interpreted as 
individuals) would require strong arguments. Whether such arguments can be provided is an open 
question in which advocates of methodological individualism carry the burden of proof.  
Another strategy for the individualist is to claim that the structural assumptions we have identified as 
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doing explanatory work do not pose a problem because structural properties can be shown to result 
from purely individualistic processes. For example, one might claim that network structures are 
generated by certain kinds of individual preferences in interaction, thus making them individualistically 
acceptable. Our replies to this objection constitute the second argument against associating ABS with 
methodological individualism. First, within a given ABS variables such as network structures are both 
structural and explanatory. That these variables could be themselves explained in individualist terms 
does not imply that their explanatory relevance vanishes. This kind of regress argument does not 
work in the case of explanation: the explanatory status of a variable does not depend on whether it 
can itself be explained (Ylikoski 2012, 40-41). Second, the individualist would still have to demonstrate 
that it is, in fact, possible to give a purely ”individualistic” explanation for these kinds of variables. It is 
difficult to see how this might happen (Kincaid 1996); nevertheless, the burden of proof is again with 
the individualist. 
Even if the individualist were to stretch her idea of methodological individualism to cover both the 
cases presented above, what would be the benefit of such a dialectical victory? Probably none.  
Our first point of caution is the observation that the track record of the debate around 
methodological individualism in resolving real micro-macro problems in the social sciences is 
controversial. It can be argued that such problems can be discussed more fruitfully without getting 
bogged down by issues related to the proper definition of ”individual properties” and ”individual 
level,” or by attempts to clarify different meanings of methodological individualism.2 The notion of 
bottom-up strategy of explanation we have articulated above suffices to capture both the idea of 
generation and the virtue of understanding mechanisms, without implying any commitments to 
principles like [MI].  
Moreover, the association of ABS with methodological individualism can make some social scientists 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	   Ylikoski (2012) offers an account of macro-micro relations that dispenses with many of the problems that 
afflict the individualism-holism debate.	  
19 
less receptive to the productive possibilities of ABS methodology. Considering that the narrow and 
negative understanding of ”methodological individualism” is common within the social scientific 
community, an overly close association between ABS and methodological individualism will only turn 
some potentially interested people away from ABS.  
Finally, there is the danger that a conceptualization of micro-macro problems in terms of 
methodological individualism may lead to biased strategies in ABS research (Wimsatt 1983). For 
example, understanding the agents in ABS exclusively as individuals might make researchers blind to 
large-scale structural factors that have significant explanatory import and that can be effectively 
modeled with ABS methodology. Similarly, thinking of properties like network topologies as 
explanatorily inert may lead to researchers systematically choosing to make simplifications and 
idealizations at this level rather than at the level of the individuals. In turn, this could lead to a 
situation in which more realistic accounts of the networks in which individuals are embedded are 
seldom tried out. Both kinds of bias would be unfortunate for the development of ABS research 
because one of its advantages is precisely that it allows social scientists to overcome (some of) the 
traditional limitations of social scientific model-building and theorizing. 
It is important to note that our argument against methodological individualism does not in any way 
imply that the traditional opponents of individualism are right. Our point is that the association of ABS 
with methodological individualism does nothing to advance our understanding of how ABS models 
explain, while at the same time it may turn out to be an obstacle to their fruitful use. It may be true 
that agent-based simulations exemplify many epistemic virtues, such as an explicit consideration of 
mechanisms and a focus on agents, which traditional methodological individualists have found 
important. However, these virtues are independent of methodological individualism. Thus, our 
suggestion is to ignore the individualism-holism debate and focus instead on how the bottom-up 
research strategy that characterizes ABS can offer new ways of studying micro-macro relations 
20 
(Ylikoski 2012).  
8. Conclusion 
Philosophical reflections on social simulations have been scarce compared to both general accounts of 
the epistemology of simulations and specific analyses of simulations in the natural sciences (see, 
however, B. Epstein 2012; Grüne-Yanoff and Weirich 2010.) In this paper we have offered an account 
of the way in which ABS is used for explanatory purposes in social science. The bottom-up research 
strategy embodied in typical ABS delivers generative explanations: it generates the macro 
phenomenon to be explained by appeal to the actions and interactions of the agents. The bottom-up 
research strategy of ABS can also yield mechanism-based explanations: it tracks the (possible) 
network of dependencies behind the phenomenon to be explained. However, we argue that the idea 
that ABS is an implementation of methodological individualism is misleading because structural 
assumptions often play an irreducible explanatory role. Finally, we have offered practical (rather than 
conceptual) arguments for resisting the association of ABS with methodological individualism, even 
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